MLS Cup XVII – Lip Service Commish and the Ratings Limbo

By Ted Westervelt

APPARENTLY, MLS Commissioner Don Garber was asked about promotion and relegation at halftime of MLS Cup XVII.  Haven’t seen the footage yet myself.  Like most soccer supporters in the US, I wasn’t watching.  Not a stop-the-presses moment by any means.  He’s given lip service to opening US leagues on more than a few occasions – most famously by coining the term “simulated promotion and relegation” a couple of years ago.

We all know MLS Cup ratings are doing the limbo.   Here’s one way to put the numbers into an historic how-low-can-they-go perspective: In 1979 (two seasons after Pele’ departed) ABC averaged 2.6 for regular season NASL broadcasts.   Despite the ballyhooed Beckham farewell, 2012 MLS Cup ratings dropped to .7.    If you’re wily in the ways of Nielson, you know it’s not always wise to compare post and pre-cable ratings – so let’s add a little more context:  Even after crossing the cable divide, no other US professional team sport has experienced a similar decline.  Imagine if 2011 Superbowl ratings dropped to 27% of the 1979 NFL regular season average.   I’d laugh, but no doubt many NFL owners would cry.

In light of this meager TV interest, it was neat to hear about the Commish’s latest pro/rel lip service.  I was more surprised by the unprecedented volume of questions on twitter that prompted it.  It used to be that a core tenant of the anti open league establishment was the cluelessness of the average American supporter.   After last Saturday, I know we’re well on the way to debunking that myth once and for all.

At the risk of surprising everyone, allow me to debunk another wives tale:  My primary objective isn’t to copy Europe.  Instead, I want to grant US clubs the same basic freedoms as any in the world:  The ability to use their support in any way they see fit.  I certainly don’t want to see relegation imposed on any limited MLS outlet.   It wouldn’t be fair.   Salary caps and sundry league micromanagement mean the final call on personnel lays with the league itself.   With such little autonomy, relegating an MLS team under these circumstances would be cruel and unusual punishment.

The facts are stark:  Free top-flight clubs and closed leagues do not mix.   The failure rate of this combination is virtually 100%.  The only system proven to accommodate free clubs is an open one.   American soccer history is strewn with the wreckage of top-flight closed leagues of unlimited clubs – and this phenomenon is not unique to the US.    I have yet to find one example of a US-style closed league of uncapped club…. That has survived.   It simply doesn’t happen.

This isn’t about promotion and relegation.  Most of my vociferous critics join Don Garber in lip service to it.   This is discussion about the captivity of American soccer clubs.  I want every US club to have same basic rights as any in the world:  The freedom to rise as far as investors and supporters can take them.   It just so happens that the only system proven to accommodate that level of freedom includes promotion and relegation.

Here’s where the tiny critics chorus pipes up:  Isn’t NFL a great example of US pro-sports system success – in which teams are limited for domestic parity and the sustainable search for profit?   Isn’t it more important to the US pro-sports fan that every team has a shot to win the title?  Wouldn’t New York and LA dominate in a pro/rel system of unlimited clubs?  Won’t we just become the Scottish Premier League, where the same clubs always win and overspenders like Rangers always threaten the entire system?

No.

First of all, even the parity premise that MLS defenders often cite is bunk.  The Los Angeles Galaxy have taken part in seven of the seventeen MLS Finals.    Four teams owned by Phil Anschutz have featured in the last two MLS Cups alone.  This doesn’t sound like competitive balance to me.

Second, our successful closed leagues operate under entirely different conditions.  NFL enjoys a level of isolation and dominance that MLS will never have – and I argue those two factors are key in the success of their provincial business model.   Put it this way:  When MLS drives every other soccer league in the world out of business or into subordination, doesn’t play any international matches, and doesn’t have lower divisions underneath them, I’ll stop ranting about pro/rel.

Do Americans abhor unlimited clubs?  Obviously not.  NBC just paid 800% more to broadcast English Premier League matches than they paid MLS for a similar privilege.  I’m not going to waste any text defining the rapid growth of EPL ratings the precipitated that contract.  Sounds like Americans appreciate great autonomous clubs as much as anyone.

If history is any guide, neither a New York nor an LA club will dominate open leagues.  If London is any example, both US megalopolises will host multiple well-funded clubs, splitting support and limiting the ability of any one of them to dominate their table.   New York City itself demonstrated this tendency in the ASL of the 1920s. At any given time, Gotham hosted a disproportionate number of teams in our first stable multi-city top flight, but they did not win a disproportionate number of titles.  In fact, they didn’t win any.

The first ASL of the 1920s (like the NASL of the 1970s) was also a fine case study of what happens when top-flight closed leagues harbor unlimited clubs: They ultimately collapse.   While it is certainly possible to argue about the causes – the outcome is always the same.    In that light, can it be a coincidence that in our latest attempt at closed league top-flight soccer MLS limits teams?   I don’t believe so.   While I don’t subscribe to their small-minded decision to limit clubs in response, I have to give them credit for identifying the problem.

As far as the doomsday scenario in which we become the SPL goes:  Bunk.  Soccer may not be, and may never be the biggest pro-sports phenomenon in the United States.   We do have dozens of potential markets – far more than Scotland, and far too many to be in D1 at the same time.    Turns out that Rangers fiscal irresponsibility fits the open league pattern: Unlike in our closed leagues, the intransigence of any one club has never resulted in an open league collapse.

So we’re limiting top-flight American clubs so that the closed leagues they’re trapped in survive.   Who cares?

I do.

Club soccer was long ago defined in an unlimited global market, and there is no indication that will change anytime soon.   Despite cases of financial mismanagement and horror stories of top clubs facing collapse, few argue European supporters will accept MLS-style limits on their clubs.

If MLS teams continue participating in open global competition, this puts them at permanent and distinct disadvantage.  How they ever go toe-to-toe with the best of the world if their league continues to unilaterally limit them?

Worse still, how can we expect our lower divisions to thrive under these circumstances?    From what I hear, the Commish pointed to underdeveloped lower divisions in his defense of the status quo.  If the English FA allowed EPL to close up shop, could anyone legitimately argue that investment in – and development of – lower divisions wouldn’t ebb?   When guys like the Commissioner of MLS predicate closed leagues on weakness in our lower divisions, do they really not consider for a moment that our closed league policies don’t serve to limit investment in our lower divisions the same way they would in England?

And what about USMNT development?  A common characteristic of World Cup winners is a thriving and open set of domestic leagues.   I don’t think it stretches common sense that a vibrant and compelling top-flight whose clubs capture the imagination of fans is instrumental in player development.  I don’t think its any coincidence that the core of our 1990 World Cup squad was composed of Cosmos fans.  For all of their closed league flaws that left them vulnerable to a financial crater, NASL captured a lot of imaginations.  Indeed, enough to average 400% higher ratings in 1979 than the 2012 MLS Cup.

Here lays the most inconvenient truth:  US Soccer has given MLS the power to limit American club soccer for profit – even if that means conceding millions of US supporters to foreign leagues.  I’d argue MLS is taking our federation up on that offer. Amongst all the external factors used to excuse MLS low ratings, I think this is the most ominous.

Finally – warmed as I am every time Don Garber gets a question about pro/rel – we have to stop asking him.  In the final analysis, this isn’t his responsibility.   Like any national federation, US Soccer is in charge of defining the pyramid.   It is they who make the D1 call.  Currently they use their responsibility to rubber-stamp MLS salary caps that limit investment in our top-flight and limit our clubs in international play.   They also grant those closed league entitlements that limit investment in our lower divisions.

While it’s been fantastic to see the Commissioner of MLS quizzed on promotion and relegation again – now is the time to recognize it’s not his call.  It’s time to ask US Soccer.  They alone define the US pyramid, sanction club and league behavior, and set policy and procedures that every club and every league must follow to get their stamp of approval.

On occasion, my views on an open US soccer pyramid have been characterized as unrealistic.  Usually my detractors come closer to calling them utter fantasy.  I on the other hand characterize anyone who believes MLS will break itself up and expose their owners to the same competition all great clubs face as completely surrealistic.   MLS owners value their entitlements.  We can’t leave promotion and relegation up to them.

Admittedly, our federation can’t force any league or any club to do anything – but like every federation they can decide what kind of behavior to sanction.   MLS, like any club or any league, must decide for themselves whether they want that sanction or not.

If you’ve followed me at all on twitter, you know what to do from here.   Policy makers set policy.   FIFA preference for promotion, relegation and independent clubs couldn’t be clearer.    Regardless of when we get proper open leagues of independent clubs, it will be because US supporters demand it from US Soccer – in every available forum and at every available opportunity.  It will not be because MLS evolved into it.

That’s why tweets from US supporters demanding pro/rel warm my heart more than any lip service commish.

MLS Simplex 1 and 2

I place MLS/US Soccer D1 trust arrangement in the realm of pathology. When combined with single entity, symptoms include:

• Limited club autonomy

• Limited quality and investment – especially in lower divisions.

• Debilitating limits on MLS sides in international competition

• Debilitating limits on US club soccer interest

• Collusive marketing arrangements that allow a MLS owners to derive revenue from subjugation on the pitch and in the marketplace

Simply put, this system handicaps US clubs in a very open global market – both on the pitch on on TV.  It develops little American talent, as evidenced by paltry sales of US players on the international market compared to even moderate soccer nations.

Despite the fact that pro-soccer is second only to NFL in key under-24 and Latino demographics, it relegates the US club game to perpetually miniscule TV ratings. It constrains the game into small stadiums, and even artificially limits capacity in larger ones. It curtails the ability of lower division teams to raise capital.

Most recently, this MLS/US Soccer single entity syndrome has left our second division clubs so weak, they must sell home field advantage in US Open Cup – the most legacy laden national club tournament in the Western Hemisphere. Worse still, it leaves our federation too incapacitated to fight that corruption in our storied US Open Cup.

Now the disease is showing signs of mutation. Under increasing pressure from fans and FIFA on promotion, relegation and autonomous US clubs, the MLS medicine show is cranking up – and biggest bottle of snake oil is MLS formula 1 and 2.

MLS breaking into two leagues and performing promotion and relegation on itself is not a cure for anything. It leaves hundreds of US clubs disenfranchised. It’s a virtual merger. Mergers don’t increase competition. They have the opposite effect.

For me, this is a critical battle in the war for the same unlimited clubs that the rest of the world enjoys – and around which the history of the game revolves. It is a fight to reach the vast potential of the club game in the US. It is about giving us clubs that can capture the imagination of supporters, not just a few risk-averse (and often conflicted) investors. It is about giving our lower division clubs access to new investors and new streams of capital – with which they will be incentivized to develop US talent. It is about sending our top clubs into international competition as unlimited as their opponents.

For MLS and SUM, this is a critical battle for single entity survival. US supporters of promotion and relegation are often accused of being copycats. We’re told we just want the game to look like England’s. The nutty thing is, if MLS forms a second division with pseudo promotion and relegation and while still locked under a system of drafts, salary caps and DP rules – that is exactly what we’ll get: An attempt to make American soccer look like a free and open market – one that accommodates great clubs and develops players.

In reality it’ll just be a gimmick. Let’s say MLS 1 and 2 gather momentum among US supporters and come into being. Here’s how things likely play out: The most successful MLS expansion teams are already pseudo-promotions. Sounders Timbers, Whitecaps and Impact have all set the bar for expansion outlets – and perhaps saved MLS neck. MLS 1 and 2 would simply institutionalize this process, and increase the league’s grip on the game. If the league does open a doggie door to promotion, it will only be availed to teams pre-selected for expansion, and will be quickly closed once MLS 1 reaches whatever they decide is full complement.

Do not expect to see relegation from MLS 1 to MLS 2. Instead, anticipate that promotion itself will be ended when they’re done building their chain of “top-flight” outlets. Also, do not assume any changes to the MLS multi-layer marketing scheme. Be secure in the knowledge that their outlets will still have to pass through the MLS single entity event horizon to get into either “league” and avail themselves to the same micromanagement and quality limits.

Be assured that the connivance in which the MLS trademarks their faux promoted properties (while clubs continue to pay them for the privilege) will continue as usual. Just as we will not see unlimited futures for any club, neither will we see any additional incentive to invest in lower divisions. Erik Wynalda is leading a fifth division team against the Portland Timbers in the US Open Cup this week. There is a fundraising effort underway to support his club. I haven’t heard any rumors of MLS 5.

No matter how you splice it, when MLS breaks itself into two salary capped and micromanaged “leagues”,  it will not cure the MLS/USSF D1 pathology. It will be a mutation designed to add another layer of resistance to the single entity disease. It will mark an effort to copy the appearance of promotion and relegation – without getting any of the qualitative benefits of independent and unfettered clubs.

For me, bandying terms around is not sufficient. For most supporters of promotion and relegation, it is not about copying nomenclature or echoing the slogans of open systems for marketing purposes.  It is about a fundamental change that will allow us the unlimited clubs that only a true system of promotion and relegation can accommodate. For me, the real cure for single entity syndrome is true open leagues and unlimited clubs, and the only way to get them is via a change in federation sanction.

For MLS/SUM, it’s pro/rel medicine show.

Doing The Same Thing Over and Over and Expecting Different Results

By Ted Westervelt

After a century of trying to do soccer like Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and the National Football League – the results are in:  the US game has failed to reach its massive potential in our closed league system.  Even today it continues to reject every effort to cloister it.

Meanwhile, the game thrived in open leagues featuring promotion and relegation.

Dysfunctional relationships between federation and closed league are chronic.  Autonomous governing bodies played a critical role in the global development of the game.  They ushered it to universal success.  Instead of being a potent force in the development of our game, our federation has been bullied, ignored and finally subordinated by our closed leagues.  Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that the behavior of US Soccer vacillated between bellicose, ineffective, inane and complaisant.

The inability of US closed leagues to tolerate independent federations is easy to plot.  Our first great top-flight league showcased world class clubs, top European talent, and a wave of US player development.   It also featured a falling out with US Soccer so complete, it set American soccer back fifty years and left the federation shell shocked.   In our second well financed shot at the big time, one league jolted the US into a footy craze, made soccer the most popular youth sport in the country, and produced a generation of players that took us back to the World Cup for the first time in forty years.   They also chose to simply ignore our federation – and collapsed as quickly as the first.   In our latest attempt at D1 professional soccer, US Soccer has simply accepted an unprecedented level of subordination to a top-flight league that limits investment, access, and interest in the US club game.   Perhaps federation control is a key component of MLS closed-league single entity survival, but TV ratings, player development and our national team stagnate alongside it.

In 1985 Giorgio Chinaglia told the Montreal Gazette, “Fans want to see strong international play.  Anything less will not draw fans.” (see timeline) In an effort to insure the survival of club soccer – in our pro sports model – MLS uses powers extorted from our federation to limit club quality.   By limiting club quality, the league prohibits teams from reaching their potential.  Judging by their consistent inability to draw interest, MLS – like all their closed league predecessors – cannot meet the demands of the increasingly sophisticated US supporter.   To be fair, they cannot accommodate billions of fans around the world who demand both stable leagues and clubs that are not arbitrarily capped in caliber.

In the twentieth century, closed US leagues of independent and unfettered clubs tumbled over financial cliffs like so many lemmings – despite consistent and demonstrable affection for the game among many Americans. In the meantime, a wildly successful, stable and unlimited global club game developed in the rest of the soccer world.   It did so under a free market system of promotion, relegation and independent clubs.  It relied on an umbrella of sovereign and potent federations, and accommodated the autonomous and boundless teams around which the game revolves.

Albert Einstein said the definition of insanity was “doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results.”  After watching US Soccer try the same thing and get the same results since Herbert Hoover, perhaps he would advocate joining the rest of the world in the open market of club soccer.  As a devout supporter of the United Nations, he would certainly support a system of healthy, independent and effective governance.

Despite Chinaglia’s warning and Einstein’s logic, our club and international game continue to flounder far behind. The US closed league straight jacket has been laced down tighter than ever before.  Today MLS survives on a cornucopia of privileges from US soccer based on precedents set by sports that little in common with soccer.  Can it be sheer coincidence that they fall further from reaching the US soccer market today than at any time in their history?

Welcome to the asylum.

1884

A group of ex-British enthusiasts meet in Newark, NJ to form the American Football Association.  It already the fourth attempt to form a national governing body for soccer.

1885

In first international match outside the British Isles, Canadian and US teams face off at Clark Field in Northern NJ.

1892

The governing body of English football adopts an open league model featuring promotion/relegation between two top leagues of independent, professional, autonomous clubs.  They decide the existing FA Cup, a competition open to every pro, amateur or league club in the country, will continue unchanged.   This basic system would stay largely stable and intact until the present day, and would be embraced by the vast majority of nations over the next century.

1893

AFA preference for semi-pro clubs drives amateur New York clubs to break away and form the American Amateur Football Association.

1894

The first attempt is made to establish a fully professional American soccer league.   It is also the first attempt by another major American sport to co-opt professional soccer into the budding American closed league model.  The six-team American League of Professional Football (ALPF) is not promoted by any of the existing soccer associations, but is formed by a group of professional baseball owners from the National League.

ALPF collapses among heavy financial losses during its first season.

1888

Independent clubs survive when the major league baseball attempt to co-opt the game fails:   American Cup Final sells out, Fall River and Kearny already fully established as soccer hotbeds.   New York Times, March 4:

1895

The National Association Football League (NAFL) is formed on a closed league model, but is created by lifting top teams in the New York City and New Jersey regional leagues.  Founding members include Kearny Scots, who endure today:

1898

NAFL is suspended due to waning fan interest.

1904

FIFA forms.   US soccer supporters are unable to coalesce behind a national soccer organizing body, and cannot secure membership.

1906

St. Louis Soccer League goes professional, but does not adopt promotion/relegation open league model that has already produced a thriving, stable pro league in England.

NAFL is revived, again under a closed league model.

Bethlehem Steel FC formed.

1913

After nine years of infighting between AFA and AAFA, FIFA finally accepts AAFA assembled bid for US membership:  The United States Football Association.  Despite this victory for supporters of the professional game, a divisive rift between professional and amateur club supporters will persist for fifty more years.

1914

In their crowning achievement, US Federation inaugurates National Challenge Cup – competition known today as the US Open Cup:

The Southern New England Football League forms under a closed league model.

Club scene thrives in San Francisco:

1916

Steel Field is built in Bethlehem, PA.   First soccer specific stadium in the US, it still stands today:

Bethlehem Steel wins third US Open Cup Final in Pawtucket, RI:

1919

Charles Schwab sends his Bethlehem Steel FC on a Scandinavian tour.   Club draws sellout crowds and compiles a winning record against top flight competition:

1921

In a move partly designed in part to purge poor, low performing clubs stagnating in their respective closed leagues, NAFL merges with SNEFL to form the nucleus of the American Soccer League (ASL).   This marks the beginning of the first golden age of US club soccer.

1922

Sam Marks builds 10,000 seat soccer specific stadium in North Tiverton, RI for his Fall River Marksmen.

St.Louis Soccer League fields top-flight clubs:

1923

ASL becomes the second most popular pro sport league in the United States behind baseball’s National League.

1924

Fall River Marksmen celebrate their first ASL championship.

US fields second Olympic squad.   Defeat Estonia 1-0 in opening match:

In prophetic early battle between federation and closed league, ASL advises clubs not to enter the National Open Challenge Cup (later to become the Lamar Hunt U.S. Open Cup) claiming schedule conflicts.

1925

American Archie Stark sets current world record for most goals scored in a single season for a top-flight club – 67 in 42 games for Bethlehem Steel, FC

Stark (front row center) tallies four times as the USMNT defeat Canada in Ebbet’s Field:

Attendance at ASL matches regularly passes 10,000.

October 31 Fall River Globe – Alarmed at exodus of top players to ASL, Scottish FA cries foul:

 

1926

Vienna Hakoah tours the US.  The European superclub’s first three matches against ASL opponents draw 25,000, 30,000 and 36,000 spectators respectively.  The tour culminates in the famous May 1 1926 match against ASL New York stars from the Giants and Indiana Flooring at the Polo Grounds:  46,000 attend the match, setting a record for an American club soccer match that will stand until 1977:

ASL establishes first “Champions League” with three ASL and five top Canadian clubs.

1927

New York Times reports on Eastern European plot to oust US Soccer from FIFA.   Austrians and Hungarians upset by ASL recruitment efforts:

Problem of cash strapped low performing clubs lingering in a closed league strikes again.  Recently purchased Philadelphia FC struggles mightily out of the box and is dropped from the season via a league office decision.  In order to balance the schedule the league abruptly drops Hartford, another struggling team.

La Liga forms as the first division of Spanish club soccer.  Unites top clubs under an open league model featuring promotion/relegation.

1928

American “Soccer War” begins begins in earnest, marking the beginning of the end of the ASL and defining persistent battle lines between closed leagues and federations.   League announces that it wants US Open Cup competitions moved to the end of the league season or its teams exempted until the season is over.   US Soccer refuses, and the ASL orders teams not to participate.  Bethlehem Steel FC, Newark Skeeters and New York Giants defy league and participate anyway.  ASL President Bill Cunningham institutes fines and suspensions on these clubs, who appeal to the USFA.  ASL refuses an order from the federation to reverse these actions and is suspended by US Soccer.

ASL continues to operate as an outlaw league, and the USFA assembles the three renegade ASL teams with other clubs from the Southern New York State Association, leading to dispute between the SNYSA and the USFA.  SNYSA teams up with the ASL against the regional Eastern Soccer League and USFA.

The New Bedford Whalers jump to the ESL mid season.

In an early example of US Soccer inefficacy, US Olympic squad chosen in an elimination tournament instead of via all-star selection.    Result was an 11-2 drubbing by Argentina:

1929

Disappointed in the quality of ESL play, New Bedford jumps back to the ASL.

The ASL and US Soccer  finally reach an exhausted compromise.  ASL abandons partially competed fall 1929 season, and in another move to purge the league of poor, underperforming clubs, merges strongest teams with better ESL teams to form the Atlantic Coast League.

1929

Serie A forms as the first division of Italian club soccer and unites top clubs under an open league model featuring promotion and relegation:

1930

Fall River Marksmen defeat Bethlehem Steel in their final US Open Cup matchup:

With a properly selected squad composed entirely of US club players, USMNT reach semi finals in the first World Cup undefeated and unscored upon – netting back to back 3-0 shutouts against Paraguay and Belgium.  Fall River Marksmen Bert Patenaude becomes first player in the history of the tournament to notch a hat-trick:

The New York Times calls the USMNT “Favorite to Win World’s Soccer Title”:

Argentina ends the USMNT World Cup run in the semifinals, defeating them 7-2.

Storied NAFL and ASL club Bethlehem Steel FC folds

Top Mexican side Nexaca embarks on US tour.

1931

Scottish champions Glasgow Celtic tour the United States:

After moving to Yankee Stadium for one season as the New York Yankees – and beating Scottish champs Celtic behind three goals from Billy Gonsalves – storied SNESL and ASL club Fall River Marksmen fold.

1933

ASL is reorganized out of existence along with every remaining storied club.   It marks the biggest closed league debacle to date, and ends the first golden age of U.S. club soccer.

Second American Soccer League (ASL II) formed with entirely new line up of clubs as a closed league – but elevates strongest amateur and semi pro teams from local leagues, including storied NAFBL clubs Kearny Scots and Kearny Irish.  Initially, league is confined to NY/NJ/Philadelphia region.   It will survive for 50 years and become the longest surviving extra-regional closed league in soccer history.

1934

USMNT exits World Cup in first round, losing to Italy 7-1.

1937

Kearny Scots win first of five consecutive ASL II league titles.

ASL II sponsors first Charlton Athletic US tour.

1938

Chicago Sparta win US Open Cup 8-0 on aggregate:


Citing political tensions, USMNT withdraws from World Cup in France.

St. Louis Soccer league goes regional as Cleveland Slavias and Chicago Sparta join their “Inter City Soccer Loop”.   First attempt at Midwestern League only lasts one year.

1943

Mexico forms national first division and adopts promotion/relegation system:

1945

United States Football Association changes name to United States Soccer Football Association.

1946

North American Soccer Football League (NASFL) formed on the closed franchise league model.

ASL II sponsors first Liverpool FC US tour.   Reds defeat NY Select team led by ageless former Fall River Marksman Billy Gonsalves:

Chicago Viking defeats Fall River Ponta Delgada for the US Open Cup 3-2 on aggregate.  First leg held in soccer specific Mark’s Stadium:

1947

NASFL folds.

1950

ASL II sponsors first Manchester United US tour.   Defeat Joe Gaetjens and NY ASL All-Stars 9-2:

USMNT appear in their third World Cup Final and stun England 1-0 in first round behind a Joe Gaetjens’ strike:

National Soccer Hall of Fame opens:

1954

CONCACAF qualification for the 1954 World Cup consists two home and away series.   In the first, US Soccer mysteriously allows scheduling of both WCQ in Mexico – and organizes no practices for the veteran squad.    USMNT lose both matches, and are eliminated before second series with Haiti begins.

1956

US fields Olympic team, but is routed by Czechs 9-1 in their first an only match.

1957

US, Mexico and Canada battle for one World Cup Finals slot.  Again, many players did not even meet until they arrived in Mexico for the first match, and US Soccer is unable schedule any practices.

After two losses to their Mexican rivals, US federation changes strategy radically:  Team is disbanded and entire US Open Cup Champion St. Louis Kutis squad is drafted to represent the country.   Strategy fails as Canadians win both remaining matches.

ASL grows to ten clubs across five states.

1958

Manchester United tours the US again.  Draws over 20,000 fans to a friendly with Hearts of Midlothian at Ebbet’s Field in Brooklyn.

1960

The second International Soccer League (ISL II) a closed league formed with off season international clubs including Bayern Munich, Sporting Lisbon, and Red Star Belgrade, and a U.S. club of stars from ASL II.

US fails to qualify for the 1962 World Cup, but ties regional power Mexico in Los Angeles 2-2.

US Open Cup Final features intriguing East/West matchup:

Manchester United tours the United States for the fourth time since 1950:

1963

West German club soccer coalesces from regional, semi-professional closed leagues into the modern Bundesliga and adopts an open league model featuring promotion and relegation.

1965

Senator Robert F. Kennedy attends Brazil v USSR friendly, meets Pele’:

1966

ISL II folds.

Tape delayed ABC telecast of 1966 World Cup Final between West Germany and England sets a US ratings record for a soccer match that will last until 1994.

ASL II expands nationally with franchises in the Midwest and Northeast.

Inspired by huge American television audiences for the World Cup, two rival investment groups led by owners of other professional sports franchises form the United Soccer Association (USA) and the National Professional Soccer Association (NPSL).  Both are set up as closed leagues.

Per the ISL II model, the USA arranges importation of entire international clubs for their inaugural season in order to get a leg up on NPSL rivals.

1967

Two top flight leagues hit the US at once.    USA and NPSL compete for US market share and both nearly go bankrupt in their first seasons.  NPSL nails a $1 million CBS contract but not a US Soccer sanction. The USA obtains sanction, but no national TV.

The New York Times struggles to explain latest US pro sports owner attempts at soccer:

First major league soccer match takes place in Atlanta:

1968

USA and NPSL purge low performing clubs and merge to form the North American Soccer League.   NASL retains US pro sports model, and does not obtain US Soccer sanction.

Manchester City tours the US.  Loses to former NPSL side Atlanta Chiefs twice:

Chicago Mustangs embark on European Tour:

Fans flood Yankee Stadium to see Pele’ and Santos defeat Napoli  June, 22  New York Times:

1969

NASL drops to five clubs and splits season  into two halves.   In first, league reverts to USA model of importing entire foreign clubs.  In the second, clubs begin play with their own rosters.

St. Louis utilizes homegrown talent in the second half – 14 Yanks on 18 man roster.

1970

CBS terminates NASL TV contract.

Madison Square Garden draws 17,000 fans to watch a World Cup match on television.

NASL takes the extraordinary step of “promoting” 2 ASL clubs to stay alive:  Rochester Lancers and Washington Darts.   Rochester leads the way in attendance at over 5000 a game.

1971

New York Cosmos admitted into NASL.

1972

NASL carries all teams from previous season – a first for the league – though Washington moves to Miami.  Also becomes first soccer league to set up college “draft”.

US qualifies for first Olympics since 1956:

1973

NASL has an American year:  an American leading scorer, three Americans among the top 10 scoring leaders, an American as the league leading goalkeeper, an American Coach of the Year, an American Rookie of the Year, four Americans on post-season all-star teams and a champion that started six Americans in the league final.

Brand new Philadelphia Atoms draw over 21,000 to their league opener go on to average 11,382 per game for the season (a new league record) win the championship, and their goalkeeper becomes the first soccer player to ever grace the cover of Sports Illustrated:

1974

Seattle Sounders admitted into the NASL:

NASL side LA Aztecs defeat Mexican powerhouse Monterrey:

San Jose Earthquakes admitted into the NASL

1975

Pele’ debuts for the New York Cosmos.  Second golden age of US club soccer begins:

NASL reaches twenty clubs.

Portland Timbers admitted into the NASL.

1976

Tampa Bay Rowdies purchase Rodney Marsh from Queens Park Rangers.  San Antonio sign former England captain Bobby Moore away from Fulham.   Los Angeles-and new part-owner Elton John – sign 29 year-old George Best.   Giorgio Chinaglia joins Cosmos from Lazio.

Sounders draw over 58,000 to the first sporting event held at the Kingdome:  A pre-season friendly with Pele’ and the Cosmos.

Minnesota averages over 23,000 per game.

1977

Playoff game between the Cosmos and the Ft. Lauderdale Strikers draws 77,691 fans to Giants Stadium, breaking the record set by Vienna Hakoah and the ASL’s New York All-Stars forty-nine years earlier:

Cosmos average 34,000 fans per game, defeat Sounders in 1977 Soccer Bowl.

1978

NASL clubs participate in record 48 international friendlies.   Cosmos tie Chelsea at Stamford Bridge in front of largest crowd of the season.  Also defeat Atletico Madrid at Vicente Calderon.

1980

Giorgio Chinaglia scores fifty regular season goals for the New York Cosmos:

Chinaglia finds the net seven times in one playoff game:

ABC averages 2.7 rating for NASL telecasts – about 2 million households – more than double the ratings of any single MLS Cup telecast:

 

RFK Stadium hosts NASL Soccer Bowl:

1983

ASL II, the longest surviving closed professional soccer league in history, folds.

United Soccer League (not to be confused with the United Soccer Leagues) formed on the closed league model:

Seattle Sounders drop out of NASL

1984

(approx)  Soccer becomes the most popular youth sport in the United States.

Los Angeles Olympic soccer matches draw massive crowds, including 78,000 for US v Costa Rica and over 100,000 for both medal matches.

New York Cosmos defeat Italian champs Juventus in front of 36,000 at the Meadowlands

Western Alliance Challenge Series (Later the western Soccer Alliance) another closed franchise league, begins with teams in San Jose, Victoria, Seattle and Portland, playing an abbreviated 7-game season.

1985

Chicago Sting win final NASL Soccer Bowl.

Montreal Gazette previews fall of the New York Cosmos.

The most storied US club since the Fall River Marksmen and Bethlehem Steel FC, New York Cosmos is reorganized into a local soccer academy.

Like their storied ASL predecessors,  NASL -  at least the seventh major attempt to force top-flight soccer into US style closed leagues – collapses in a sea of red ink.

Portland Timbers reincarnated into WSA.

USL folds

1986

Only four professional outdoor soccer clubs remain in North America – the lowest number since 1905.  Still, one of them draws a visit from Manchester City:

USMNT fail to qualify for World Cup final.

1987

Lone Star Soccer Alliance debuts in Texas and surrounding states as a closed franchise league.

The third American Soccer League (ASL III) debuts as a closed franchise league in the eastern US:

1988

FIFA awards World Cup 1994 to the US on the condition that the USSF establish a first division professional league.

1989

Sunbelt Indoor Soccer League (SISL) a closed franchise indoor league based in Florida and run by Former NASL executive Francisco Marcos debuts an eight-club outdoor season.

43,000 fill Franklin Field in Philadelphia to watch the USMNT defeat top Russian club Dnepr 1-0.

USMNT qualify for first World Cup Finals since 1950:

1990

USMNT make first World Cup Finals appearance since 1950.   Eliminated after losing every group stage match.

FIFA endorsed candidate Alan Rothenberg defeats long time incumbent USSF President Werner Fricker.

ASL III merges with the WSA to form the American Professional Soccer League  (APSL) under the closed league model.   FIFA sanctions APSL as the US second division league.  Together, they employ future US MNT stars Marcelo Balboa, Tab Ramos, Kasey Keller and John Harkes:

1991

APSL nearly folds, but survives through another purge of non-performing, financially weak US clubs from a closed league.

1992

SISL outdoor league grows to 21 clubs under a closed franchise model and is renamed the United States Interregional Soccer League (USISL):

Trying to meet FIFA demand for a first division league,  an investment group headed by USSF President Alan Rothenberg that includes NFL and former NASL investors battles, APSL, USISL, and the indoor MISL for  FIFA/US Soccer first division sanction.    Federation takes bids for leagues, does not open leagues for clubs.

1993

J-League inaugural season marks the beginning of an open league model, featuring promotion and relegation, for Japanese club soccer.   Japanese professional baseball maintains American closed league model:

Canadian Soccer League folds. At this juncture, no D1 soccer league exists anywhere in the world fully committed to US style closed model:

Aided by the vast net worth of his partners, Rothenberg led group calling itself Major League Soccer prevails in battle for US first division sanction, promises to begin play in 1995.  US Soccer sanctions MLS despite their continued adherence to a closed model – at least the eighth such national attempt in US club soccer history.   Federation also grants MLS a unique single-entity business model in which league owns every tea – and with it the power to limit the quality of every club via salary caps and squad limits.

APSL bid for D1 rejected, despite the fact that league is up and running with six clubs including Tampa Bay Rowdies and Montreal Impact.

USMNT play record 34 matches in preparation for 1994 World Cup Final – nearly a full club season in many countries.

1994

USA hosts first World Cup Final,  draws record 3.6 million spectators, at a record average of 67,000 per game – despite the fact that the country does not have a running first division soccer league.

Top six best attended soccer games in US history remain World Cup matches held in the Rose Bowl.   Final between Italy and Brazil draws all time US record 101,799:

USMNT advance to second round for the first time since 1930.

Seattle Sounders join APSL.

APSL refuses offer from MLS to join their single entity.   Owners prefer to own clubs and players as practiced all over the world.

MLS moves back opening day to 1996.

1995

APSL changes name to A-League.

Chasing ghosts of Bert Patenaude and the 1930 USMNT World Cup semifinalists, Earnie Stewart and his USMNT storm to Copa America Semis in Uruguay.  Run includes a 3-1 trouncing of Gabriel Batistuta’s Argentina:

In a consolidation of power unprecedented in over one hundred years of professional US club soccer, the A-League and USISL work out an agreement to act as farm systems for the MLS.  For the first time, the United States has a recognized three-tiered league structure, sanctioned by FIFA – although clubs are still institutionally blocked from moving between divisions.

1996

Major League Soccer (MLS) arrives.   League places a high priority on relative team parity and discount pro-sport ticket pricing.  In response to the problems their predecessors encountered applying the American closed franchise model to national club soccer,  US Soccer grants MLS an unprecedented array of intrusive top-down policies and procedures.  On paper, MLS is organized under a single entity corporate structure with teams managed by investor/owners.   League manages all player salaries, signings, allocations, approves all trades limits teams to five foreigners, institutes a salary cap of $1.25 million per team and a maximum player salary of $175,000, and pays all players directly.  Investor/owners of each team “invest” to the tune of $75 million – ostensibly to cover expected operating losses for the first five seasons of the league.  Ten corporate sponsors sign, and television contracts are signed with ABC, ESPN, ESPN2 and Univision.   NFL owner and NASL backer Lamar Hunt is a major investor.

Top Mexican goalkeeper Jorge Campos leaps into MLS:

DC United win inaugural MLS Cup.

MLS average attendance hits 17,695.

USISL establish Select League of top teams in an effort to gain second division status.

1997

Select League and A-League merge and receive second division US Soccer sanction under A-League name.

MLS average attendance drops by over 1000 fans per game.

1998

US cannot advance out of World Cup group stage.

DC United win CONCACAF Champions Cup.

In the high water mark for MLS in international competition, DC United become champions of the western hemisphere by defeating South American club champion Vasco De Gama in the InterAmerican Cup:

1999

USISL changes name to United Soccer Leagues.   A-League is absorbed into USL-1 and recognized as American second division, USL-2 as third division.

2000

MLS average attendance drops to all time low of 13,366.

LA Galaxy wins CONCACAF Champions Cup.

Former NFL International chief Don Garber named Commissioner of MLS:

2001

MLS contracts to ten teams by purging Tampa Bay Mutiny and Miami Fusion.

Portland Timbers reincarnated into A-League/USL-1.

2002

San Jose Earthquakes reincarnated into MLS.

USMNT advance to quarterfinals in the World Cup.

Only a heroic effort from Oliver Kahn and suspect officiating keeps the USMNT from making their first World Cup semifinal appearance since 1930:

2003

Manchester United pays MLS $4 million transfer fee for Tim Howard:

2006

Kraft Soccer Executive and Columbia Econ Professor Sunil Gulati ascends to volunteer Presidency of US Soccer.

Once In A Lifetime – The Extraordinary story of the New York Cosmos debuts in theaters.

MLS moves storied NASL brand San Jose Earthquakes to Houston to become the Dynamo.

Fulham pays $4 million transfer fee to MLS for Clint Dempsey:


2007

Cultural Icon David Beckham signs with MLS/Los Angeles Galaxy:

MLS average attendance rises to 16,202.

2008

MLS sells Jozy Altidore to Spanish first division club Villareal for record transfer fee of $10 million.

San Jose Earthquakes re-reincarnated into MLS.

FIFA President Sepp Blatter announces that preference will be given to prospective World Cup host nations who adopt open league model featuring promotion and relegation.

FIFA calls promotion and relegation by sporting criteria “The essence of the game.”

Australia’s soccer governing body announces plans to move from franchise model to open league model featuring promotion and relegation.   Once completed, this move will leave the United States and Canada the last major soccer nations committed to a closed league model for domestic club play.

Average MLS attendance drops 1.8%

2009

Seattle Sounders reincarnated into MLS for a reported franchise fee of $30 million – and average nearly 30,000 fans per game.

Despite remarkable success in Seattle, As of early June, MLS average attendance drops 8.8%.

USL-1 club Puerto Rico Islanders advance further than all MLS teams in CONCACAF Champions League play.

US President Barack Obama announces bid for 2018/2022 World Cup Final.   Meets FIFA President Sepp Blatter in the White House.    Blatter asks US President when the US will adopt promotion and relegation system for club soccer.

MLS announces plans to reincarnate Portland Timbers into MLS.

As pressure mounts on US Soccer, MLS Commissioner Don Garber responds to question on promotion/relegation and open league play on the MLS web site:

“Unfortunately our country does not have the infrastructure to support promotion/relegation at this time.   We’ll continue to monitor this, but it will likely be at least ten years before promotion/relegation could ever be considered.”

Americans buy more tickets to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa than citizens of any other nation.

USMNT lose to Mexico 5-0 in Gold Cup finals.

Massive US crowds assemble for international matches:  LA Galaxy v Barcelona – 93,137 • Mexico v Haiti – 85,000 • Chelsea v Inter Milan – 81,224 • Mexico v USA – 79,156

2010

Citing financial trouble,  MLS and US Soccer allow National Soccer Hall of Fame close its doors.   Invaluable collection amassed over sixty years is scattered across the country.

After struggling into the knockout stages, USMNT eliminated by Ghana in World Cup play for the second straight time.

Re-animated NASL brand obtains provisional D2 sanction from US Soccer:

Despite the efforts of President Clinton, Morgan Freeman, Brad Pitt, Spike Lee and others, US loses bids to host 2018 and 2022 World Cups to Russia and Qatar respectively.

Despite little promotion, US Open Cup Final between Seattle Sounders and Columbus Crew draws 31,311 fans to Qwest Field, breaking tournament attendance record set in 1929.

2011

Another huge attendance year for international matches in the US:  Manchester United v Barcelona – 81,807 • Mexico v El Salvador – 80,108 • US v Argentina – 78,682

Portland Timbers and Vancouver Whitecaps “promoted” and  join Seattle Sounders in MLS.    Reincarnated NASL clubs draw massive local interest and allow MLS to eek out a new average attendance record.

Seattle Sounders win their second consecutive US Open Cup, and set another new attendance record – 35,615:


Despite failure rate of lower division US clubs at nearly 75% since the inception of MLS,  NASL narrowly avoids US soccer desanction.  MLS Commissioner and President Gulati abstain from vote.

Real Salt Lake drives to the Finals of the CONCACAF Champions league, but succumbs to Monterrey.

Juergen Klinsmann hired to coach USMNT.

Fox begins broadcasting English Premier League games on broadcast television.   Ratings dwarf those of any MLS Cup, much less MLS regular season matches.

The New York Cosmos brand is reborn.   Club opens new academy, signs MUFC great Eric Cantona and USMNT legend Cobi Jones to lead the club back to MLS and/or top flight soccer:

Fox loses contract to broadcast MLS to NBC – though Fox bid was reportedly significantly higher.

Volunteer US Soccer President/MLS owner employee Sunil Gulati changes title at Kraft soccer from President of the New England Revolution to Special Adviser to the Kraft Family.

A century deep in US professional soccer history awash with closed league failures, MLS Commissioner Don Garber said this when asked about promotion/relegation:

“While I personally think promotion and relegation would be very exciting, the professional soccer landscape in the United States and Canada is not mature enough to support this type of system.”

2012

US fails to qualify for the Olympics for only the second time since the 1970s.

NASL Commissioner David Downs says promotion and relegation is in his wildest dreams.

Montreal Impact “promoted” to MLS.

Final US clubs eliminated in the quarterfinals of the CONCACAF Champions League.

ESPN releases poll showing dramatic rise of club soccer popularity in the US:

NBC begins broadcasting MLS on their new sports channel.   Ratings remain largely unchanged.

 

Two Pyramids: A Responsible Path to Promotion, Relegation and Unlimited US Soccer Clubs

THE momentum for change is real. Over the last decade or so, demands for promotion, relegation and fully fledged US soccer clubs have propagated as dramatically as the popularity of club soccer itself. More US supporters of every shape, size and color are speaking out for open US soccer leagues and fully independent clubs than ever before.

The market demand is there, too. More Americans get their soccer from open leagues than ever before – while TV ratings and internet search reveal an MLS that appeals to a smaller slice of US supporters than at any point in their history.

The battle is even entering the legal sphere. Two US leagues are questioning a trust arrangement that guarantees MLS valuable D1 status from US Soccer – by way of FIFA. One of them is threatening to take those demands to court.

The pressure isn’t only domestic. FIFA’s commitment to promotion and relegation as the essence of the game remains so strong, MLS is currently bracing for an intervention from them.

Suffice it to say – it is time to start believing the hype: We are poised to break a US sports cartel. It will not only mark a dramatic shift in American soccer history. It will be a seminal moment in American history.

One way or another, promotion and relegation is coming to American professional soccer. Let’s get it right the first time. Let’s skip the gimmicks, the pre-compromises and the poison pills we know are coming. We need a workable open league plan that fits the United States in every dimension. One that is truly national in scope. One that isn’t run by any one league. One that is properly installed and governed by an independent federation. One that addresses both our vast geography and enormous market and the financial fears of every owner. One that finally ushers our game into a new dimension in which it’s awesome potential can finally be realized. One that gives all investors choices. One that grants top-flight opportunity to dozens of US clubs.

Enter the octahedron.

Don’t worry. It’s just a fancy name for two pyramids stuck together.

One thing is for sure. In a nation roughly the size of Europe in both geographic and market size, we’ll need a plan that works for a plethora of clubs over dozens of market. Including our top four divisions, recent D5 entries, and NCAA sides – and despite a closed system that perpetually suffocates interest and investment – we already have over 1000. Two open pyramids – East and West – effectively answer those demands. Dual pyramids give US clubs more chances to prove themselves both here in the massive US market – and the global one beyond. They come fully equipped with 36 lucrative D1 slots to shoot for.

US supporters are increasingly upset by the fact that we continue to arbitrarily trap lower division sides in a caste system while flinging limited MLS outlets into unlimited international competition. Two pyramids answer their concerns. They will give us the same vibrant and unlimited clubs the rest of the world enjoys. We get clubs that draw passionate support in lower divisions, and top-flight clubs that go international competition unfettered by rules endemic to our cloistered leagues.

At the core of the need for an octahedral plan stands an inconvenient truth. One key to the meritocracy of promotion and relegation is a balanced schedule: In order for a table to reflect team quality at the end of the season accurately enough to justify relegation and promotion, every team must play each other twice in a home and away series. Thus, a single pyramid becomes unwieldy once divisions grow too far beyond 20 clubs. MLS is rumored to plan expanding to as many as 32 sides – not an absurd figure by any means in our huge market. Problem is, in an open pyramid with a balanced schedule, that would require over 60 league matches.

Unfortunately – there’s only 52 weeks in a year.

That’s why we need more than one pyramid. We’re not a small European nation. We need a open system that accommodates a number a independent top flight clubs commensurate with our massive size. Add a measured transition that address virtual concerns – and a two pyramid system becomes the clear choice to fit a fully open American soccer market. Two top-flights of eighteen clubs mean every D1 side can commit to a balanced league schedule with room to spare. In fact, each would play 34 matches – the same number MLS sides will play in 2015. The 36 top-flight slots between them will also allow most potential D1 markets to be reached – over a wide geographic spread – while still leaving plenty of schedule room for Champions League, US Open Cup and perhaps even other competitions.

Once fully implemented, this regionalized plan will address one of the longest lingering pro/rel concerns: Travel costs. That’s just for starters. It also accommodates both playoffs and existing East/West conference setups. It ensures wide geographic and market spread. Most importantly, it will finally give every US soccer club the same opportunities as any in the world – whilst giving each of them a transition period in which to plot their own destiny.

As hysterical claims of cultural roadblocks to pro/rel fall away – and with 36 top flight slots virtually guaranteeing at least one top flight club in each mega market – the final bulwark between us and unlimited US soccer teams snaps into focus:

MLS.

There’s no intellectual, societal or fiduciary roadblock between promotion/relegation and US fans, broadcasters, sponsors or lower division owners. Only the anti-competitive demands of MLS – and their curious control over the fates of hundreds of clubs outside their business – stand in the way. They argue that they have sunk too much cash into the league – under the auspices of first division guarantees – to suddenly risk it all in open competition.

This plan even addresses their dubious closed market concerns – to the tune of $2 billion.

Regardless of how one judges the legitimacy of these concerns or the weight of these demands, a responsible transition to an open and regional two-pyramid system addresses virtually every one.

Transition and Structure

The key element of the transition period – one that should assuage the fears of every owner and fan – is:

No relegation.

It all begins at the bottom. Every division will be required to fill – via promotion from the next lower division – to their 18 club capacity before promotion to the next relegation begins. Relegation will not commence in any division until all divisions are full.

This point cannot be overemphasized: During this transition phase, clubs will only be promoted. There will be no relegation – until every division reaches full complement. Only then will the first drops occur.

At a moderate pace of 3 promotions a year, the transfer to dual open East/West pyramids can be completed in as little as 5 years. It will protect all owners from relegation until that time, and drive badly needed investment and interest to our lower tiers. It only requires an activist, independent federation – a hallmark of healthy soccer nations worldwide.

Here is how it will work:

• First, US Soccer divides the country into East and West regions. These regions become the foundation of the two pyramids. At least first, second, third and fourth divisions are initially sanctioned. MLS, NASL, USL and NPSL clubs are all invited to join in their respective divisions. If and when interest demands – and standards are met – we can build down to D5 and further.

• Eighteen club limits are set for each division. Stadium standards will also be set for each: If a club does not meet those requirements, it will not be promoted – or admitted into the initial setup. Initially, every club could also be required to show financial ability to complete their season. This could take the form of an escrow account in which every club must deposit agreed upon travel costs in each league.

• Existing teams in every division would be offered initial sanction to their respective division – but all would be free to decline that invitation. They would simply have to forfeit their divisional sanction.  Also, any team that chooses to voluntarily pass on promotion would be welcome to do so.

• When leagues reach full complement, every division will promote two and relegate two. Each D1 will relegate two, send league winners into the CONCACAF Champions League, and host an East/West playoff to determine the third slot. Until full complement is reached, leagues can continue to play in one national structure.

Possibilities and Assumptions

• If initial interest in D3 and D4 is too large – a play-in tournament could be organized for every club that meets basic financial and stadium standards. Given the burgeoning size of our current D3 and D4, this could bring both to full complement in the first year. Promotion to D2 would then be able to commence in year two. Assuming more than three clubs were promoted each year, both pyramids could reach full complement in two or three years. All depends on how many are able to be promoted each year during the transition. I would accelerate that process as quickly as the market bears.

• The bottom division would be defined by demand. Whether it’s D4, D5 or even lower, a petition process – with standards – could be installed to bring new clubs in at that level.

• Two assumptions are intrinsic to this transition: Arbitrary salary caps and the player draft system will be removed from every participating league. Canadian teams will be required to reach special arrangements with US Soccer should they choose to participate in our leagues – as Welsh clubs do in the English FA.

• Admittedly a two-pyramid system would require a special sanction from FIFA. As it adheres to the essence of the game as outlined by the world governing body, I hope they will. The US market is comparable in size to that of the entire European continent. Europe hosts dozens of pyramids. I think FIFA would be wise to grant us two.

Benefits to MLS

A responsible transition will be a boon to every level of US club soccer – while protecting MLS investors. They will be granted several additional years free of relegation – and major advantages over newly promoted clubs in legacy and continuity when it hits. Until D1s reach full complement, they could even be allowed to continue with the national single entity trappings to which they have become accustomed.

Obviously MLS should be compensated for all infrastructure they’ve built and the risks owners have taken. This plan virtually guarantees it. As the owner of every team trademark, MLS could – and should – sell each and every team out of the existing structure. Assuming an average team value of $100 million, that’s over $2 billion MLS could bank in this transition – and redistribute to owners – per single entity prerogative.

That’s not the only MLS advantage in this plan. By the time their outlets have to face the specter of relegation some will have a quarter century of continuous D1 legacy to draw upon. This will give them a big leg up over newly promoted clubs filling out the bulk of our first divisions – before the first relegation ever takes place.

Perhaps most importantly, every league and club has the final choice to either participate in an open system or not — and in this transition, MLS owners will have the most time to make that decision. Structural changes like elimination of caps and player drafts would only be imposed on D1 when promotion began. This gives MLS years to decide for themselves whether they would like to participate in this transition, sell their outlets out of single entity captivity, or even continue to pursue their destiny in a separate, unsanctioned league.

Promotion and relegation is MLS’s choice. They are free to decide – for themselves – whether to participate or not. In a scenario in which MLS breaks away from the new US pyramids, D2s would become D1s, D3s to D2s, and so forth. Perhaps a provision could be made to allow non-league MLS outlets to continue to participate in the US Open Cup – should they choose to pursue it. Under no circumstances, however, will a closed MLS be able to maintain a D1 sanction from a US soccer federation. That means no Champions League play – unless – perhaps – an MLS outlet can capture US Open Cup.

Capping all divisions at 18 teams apiece will mean a manageable 34 league matches for each club, leaving room for inter and extra league play. This will be very important for D1s on which the heaviest schedule demands are placed. A revitalized US Open Cup could go back to a home and away series – and implemented to feature East/West match-ups not found in league play. A Carling Cup type competition (or even a revived Superliga) could also be implemented and feature competition between the two pyramids. An East/West D1 playoff for the American championship – and third Champions League slot – would also add interest and interleague play. Indeed, an American style D1 playoff system between leagues could easily be implemented at every division level – with promotion on the line – a la the Championship in England.

Benefits to Lower Divisions

Sir Alex Ferguson famously said that the end of relegation would be suicide for lower division English clubs. By opening an avenue to promotion we will breathe new life into ours. Should MLS decide to maintain salary caps during the transition, a few lower division clubs may surpass MLS outlets on the pitch quite quickly. Given the broad appeal for promotion and relegation in the US soccer supporter community – there is virtually no doubt lower division clubs would see a dramatic spike in interest, investment, and value. Using EPL and Championship club as a guide, some lower division club could see appraisal values spike by 1000%  – or more.  Of course, results will very, but all will see increases in value. Gone will be the days when a lower division owner simply walks away from his team – as happened recently in Pensacola.

One of the most common and persistent fears of a pro/rel system is travel costs for cash strapped lower division clubs. Regionalized leagues are a hallmark of this plan – and end this fear. Indeed, I see no reason that leagues can’t be broken down to even smaller regions in lowest levels of the pyramid should the need to further mitigate these costs remain.

As mentioned, MLS could continue to limit their own teams until promotion reached D1. With lower division investment and interest building at a rapid clip, this might not prove a wise move. As the transition progresses, we are sure to find out about ambitious lower division clubs in US Open Cup play.

Conclusions

Promotion, relegation and unfettered clubs will draw fantastic new interest, investment and quality to the US club game. On this there is virtually no more argument.

This transition to promotion and relegation will not hang MLS investors out to dry. This plan addresses their concerns directly: If existing MLS owners are too risk averse to continue, rising values will enable them to sell high – long before they face the prospect of relegation. Even when relegation finally begins in both D1s, MLS sides will have a cushion of recently promoted lower division clubs to further dilute their risk.

If these advantages still don’t work for MLS, they are welcome to opt out. This point cannot be overemphasized. They are absolutely free to exist without a D1 sanction via an independent international sporting organization – like their NFL role models.  There is no mandate for any league or club to participate in an open system. All are free forge their own futures – minus a division sanction, of course.

Just as MLS’s opt-out contingency can’t be overstressed – most important to every lower division investor will be dates certain by which this open market transition will occur. While there will be some wiggle room on timing and standards in this transition as clubs decide their futures and strive to meet financial and stadium standards, there can be no scenario in which this transition can be allowed to exceed 6 years. This system is founded on opportunity. Those opportunities must be guaranteed in the near – and defined – term.

We have tried to do club soccer our provincial way for over century now. It has proven totally ineffective and unstable unless both club quality and league access – and thus interest in the US club game – are strictly limited. Even then, it’s a dubious claim. Plenty argue today that MLS is still fragile – after 20 years.

The fact is, every closed top-flight US league of unlimited soccer clubs has failed – and lower division club collapse rates are even more apocalyptic. It’s a fantastically unstable system for professional soccer. We’ve already lost over 200 D4 clubs since MLS arrived in 1996.

In effect, we are limiting quality, access, opportunity and investment in US club soccer – in an otherwise open global market – so that a tiny few US pro sports owners can get their way. It is no coincidence that our national teams stagnate alongside that system.

Leave no doubt, this wide open octahedron will usher these persistent problems out of American soccer once and for all. Historically, stable soccer leagues are always open. Over the century in which scores US soccer leagues have fallen like dominoes – and oftentimes their teams with them – virtually no fully open and federation sanctioned pyramid has ever collapsed. Two open pyramids give us the same system of unlimited clubs every top soccer nation enjoys – all the while addressing both our uniquely vast market and geography. They allow us to send the best clubs we can produce into unlimited international play. They will drive investment to dozens of US cities capable of hosting their own top-flight soccer club. They will drive massive new interest to our lower divisions. They will grant us a stable system in which every US club can finally be a fully fledged participant on the global stage of club soccer – for the first time in our long, dramatic and oftentimes tragic soccer history.

Implemented responsibly, this system will even give MLS owners time to adjust, put the odds of D1 survival in their favor, and increase the value of their brands.

We’re a unique country. We cannot just graft a small market English system onto our massive pro-sports market. Two open American pyramids address more of our concerns than a English one. They are an effective American response to the promotion/relegation bogeymen.

History is conclusive on this point: Once fully opened, soccer pyramids never collapse.

We’ll be blessed with two of them.

 

Listen Up New York: Cosmos Too Infinite for MLS

By Ted Westervelt

“If you wish to make an apple pie from scratch, you must first invent the universe.”

Carl Sagan

 

The Cosmos of the 1970s defined the vast potential of US club soccer.  They also proved our closed league system was incapable of sustaining the great clubs we needed to reach it.

It’s going to take some strong attitudes and in-your-face tactics to change our ways.   It’s up to you, New York.

So far, the only way closed top-flight soccer leagues have been able to survive are under tight restrictions on access, quality and investment.   That is the MLS/US Soccer system.   Under that system, the New York Cosmos, every existing MLS outlet, and every lower division club trapped underneath them will never be permitted to be all they can be.

As the most recognized global brand in American club soccer – and one that minted their legacy as a truly unlimited club – the Cosmos should not be forced to accept MLS mediocrity.  They should not relinquish their name to any league that foists a hyper controlled one-size-fits-all domestic pro sports model onto the global sport of soccer, no matter how much it shields owners from financial risk.

New York: You deserve the same shot at a world-class soccer club as any other world class soccer city.   you definitely deserve more than another stunted MLS outlet.  The only proven route to that land of unlimited opportunity winds through a US Soccer sanction of promotion, relegation and independent clubs.

Fact is, the one league structure that has proven totally incapable of accommodating unlimited soccer clubs like the Cosmos is ours.  It is a system designed for dominant and isolated sports leagues whose teams do not face real international competition.   Perhaps our local, cloistered domestic sports leagues tolerate intrusive management, quality checks, and demarcations on investment.   Soccer does not.

After a league like NFL corners the global market on a sport, maybe they can impose whatever limits they want on their teams.  Professional soccer leagues do not have that luxury.  For starters, there are hundreds of professional soccer clubs in the world, compared with a tiny handful of pro American football teams.   Unlike NFL teams, they all vie for supremacy in an open global marketplace.  NFL teams can’t even play their Canadian brothers.

In order to really begin this conversation, a couple of myths must be dispensed with:

1. Overspending in and of itself did not kill the Cosmos or NASL.  In fact, overspending only kills closed soccer leagues like the NASL.   The Cosmos star rose as quickly as the pioneering US superclubs of the 1920s, only to fall prey to the same closed league suffocation that befell all their predecessors.

2. To those who believe that US professional club soccer didn’t exist in the 1920s:  Ask the Austrian and Hungarian federations, who pushed FIFA to de-sanction US Soccer for allowing ASL raids on their top club players.   Ask the Scottish FA, who called the phenomenon “The American Menace”.

Before succumbing to US closed soccer league malaise, the Cosmos and NASL proved the game was as hot a commodity in the 1970s as it was in the 1920s – when at least five top-flight clubs dotted the New York metropolitan area.  Between 1975 and 1980, the Cosmos drew more fans than either the Yankees or the Giants, in Giants Stadium.   In 1980, their league averaged ten times more TV viewers for regular season matches than the MLS Cup averages today.   Perhaps most importantly, they left a legacy of new clubs, like the Sounders, Timbers, Rowdies, great soccer towns like Rochester and Toronto, and record levels of youth participation in their wake.  Indeed, in 1990, a team composed largely of Cosmos supporters reached the World Cup Final for the first time in forty years.

Cosmos owner Steve Ross got it right.  World-class players like Pele, Chinaglia, Beckenbauer, and Alberto did not run the Cosmos or NASL into the ground.  It wasn’t massive owner investments in personnel that created the conditions for another massive league collapse.  The failure rate of closed top-flight soccer leagues of unlimited, independent clubs is virtually 100%.  Even the Cosmos couldn’t beat those odds.

The Cosmos were an independent club – and how.  They set their own spending limits, chose their own players their destiny was limited only by their quality of play (and lack of a FIFA sanction).  This is the infinite universe in which the Cosmos rose and North American soccer interest re-awoke.  Could they have built that lasting legacy with a MLS salary cap set at 1/40th of the average EPL team?   Would they have set New York on fire as a limited MLS owned soccer outlet?

No.

In all reality, it was a hapless US Soccer and an NASL incapable of questioning US pro sports owner entitlements that got it wrong.   Despite all the evidence that change was required, US Soccer failed to adopt the system of open leagues and unlimited clubs that accompanied the game to global dominance, and our top leagues failed to lobby them for it.

To be fair, sanctioning promotion and relegation too big a job for any league.  In comparison to our derelict federation, the NASL, their ASL predecessors, and the Cosmos can hardly be blamed for not implementing it.  The responsibility for sanctioning the required open habitat for unlimited soccer clubs rests with strong, independent, and cohesive national governing bodies.

Problem is, we haven’t had one for a really long time.

By any measure of fortitude, US Soccer has always been is a basket case.  Our top-flight closed leagues have consistently failed to work hand in hand with strong, autonomous federation, and our federation has failed to open them.  As a result, league after closed league has challenged the authority and legitimacy of our federation, and the US game has always lost.  The one sure-fire cure for runaway closed league power at the heart of this dysfunctional relationship is a federation sanctioned system of promotion, relegation and autonomous clubs.

After being walked on for so many years, US Soccer is simply too scared to implement it.

It is impossible to overstress the extent of this dysfunctional relationship.  For starters, it has been going on for a century.  Indeed, the last time our federation stood up against a top-flight closed league in any dramatic fashion was 1928.   When ASL President Bill Cunningham tried to move US Open Cup matches out of the league season, our federation opposed that move.  Unfortunately the sanction battle that followed this first great row between closed league and federation led to the first great US soccer league collapse.   In the 1970s, NASL chose simply to ignore our federation and their US Open Cup.   They disappeared a decade later.

These two big domestic soccer disputes are even sadder when placed in context:  They both occurred during huge peaks in the number of professional US soccer clubs – the same conditions under which nearly every federation in the world sanctioned open leagues.  Dead set on American style closed leagues – and battling for relevance in the club game – US Soccer squandered both chances.  In each instance, our federation clung desperately to the only soccer league structure in the world to ever go bankrupt or fold – and ASL and NASL obliged.

Today we find ourselves at yet another peak of high functioning outdoor soccer clubs.  Unfortunately, our federation is no better position to take advantage.  Since the demise of NASL, US Soccer  has gone from weak-and-irrelevant to weak-and-ancillary.  They continue to adhere to the only soccer league structure incapable of accommodating a league of unlimited, independent clubs.   Now they do so as an blatant subordinate to one league.  Case in point:  Our current US Soccer President is paid by an MLS owner – not the federation he leads.

Blinded by the success of the closed major league baseball system and enamored with their anti-trust exemptions, perhaps US Soccer could be forgiven for their shortsightedness in the 1920s.  By the 1970s, they had become legally blind and gun shy.    Today, perhaps they are simply blindfolded.

To be fair, US Soccer noticed the closed league conundrum.  Perhaps they just couldn’t see well enough not to throw the baby out with the bathwater.   Instead of disposing of a system that was incapable of accommodating unlimited clubs, they granted a cartel of MLS owners more power than any closed league before them.   Their D1 entitlements, league ownership, salary caps, are just part of a wide array of permissions – unprecedented in the soccer world -  to limit quality, investment, and access.

Despite a few welcome changes since the NASL days, we find ourselves in a familiar conundrum:  The sport has again emerged in a very big way on the US sports landscape, while our game lags behind.  FIFA insisted that the US form a proper pyramid as a prerequisite for hosting the 1994 World Cup, and US Soccer obliged.   Thanks to their hyper controls on the US soccer pyramid, MLS even looks capable of surviving indefinitely.  Unfortunately, the cost of MLS entitlements is very high:  Our club game remains trapped in a closed league system that has repeatedly suffocated it.   Our top league survives on infomercial TV ratings, quality limits and by riding the coattails of the international game and foreign leagues.   Worse, player development – and the national team that depends on it – stagnate alongside our stunted pyramid.

US Soccer and their league bosses have convinced a few rabid supporters that their unique closed structure and single entity limits have been put in place to protect the game from failure.  They insist their curbs on quality and access are designed to protect the game from the horrible damage boundless clubs like the Cosmos are sure to inflict.

It’s a bogus argument, Gotham.  Their randomized match outcomes, tight controls on club autonomy and a caste system of lower division clubs may be the keys to MLS closed league survival.  They also contribute to a chronic syndrome in which we continue to lag far behind the world’s top leagues in interest, investment and player development.

The truth is the Cosmos defibrillated the American professional club game – forty-five years after ASL crashed in their own  closed league chaos.  They did so by investing tremendous amounts of money on players.  They didn’t kill the game by spending too much money.   The simply couldn’t escape the creeping rot that infects every unlimited soccer club trapped in the clutches of a closed league.

It is also fair to say that the USMNT wouldn’t have awoken from a forty-year nap without them.

The only proven path to a boundless future for the Cosmos and the American game is a federation sanctioned system of promotion, relegation and fully independent clubs.   When US Soccer has the courage to implement it, our destiny will be will be limitless again.

So speak up, New York.  FIFA has already called promotion and relegation based on sporting criteria the “essence of the game”.  Our clubs will be prohibited from freely exercising their support to improve their lot only as long as supporters like you fail to challenge sketchy MLS claims.

If the New York Cosmos become just another limited MLS outlet, it will depend on New Yorkers who don’t believe they deserve better.   Instead, lend US Soccer your courage and your class.  You’re loud, abrasive, direct and effusive.  You’re a world-class soccer city that deserves more than a limited MLS soccer drive thru – even if you get free soda.  A captive US Soccer can only do the bidding of MLS only as long as supporters like you permit it.

 

 

Why American Soccer for Chuck and I

By Ted Westervelt

The history of American club soccer is embarrassingly epic in scope and scale.  It’s a drama packed with gritty underdog performances, spectacular performances of unlimited clubs, and mind-boggling international upsets.  It features world record-setters, remarkable personal highs and bottomless league lows.

In large measure, it is a narrative our federation no longer supports.

As in every footballing nation, the story of our game is rooted in old nationalist agendas, powerful passions and brash characters.  It’s chocked full corny clichés, stacked with examples of our incredible stubbornness, and overflowing with stories of remarkable resilience and dramatic passion.

It is dark comedy that our passion for the game and our great soccer legacy remains largely untapped, uncelebrated, and unrecognized.  It is a tragedy that our sports leagues fail to provide a habitat for the unlimited clubs at the core of soccer’s story.

I know I speak for Chuck when I say our federation should showcase more stories like this:

May 6, 1916 – Pawtucket, Rhode Island:

Coats Field stands filled to the gills for the third annual National Challenge Cup Final – a competition known today as the Lamar Hunt US Open Cup.

The Fall River Rovers are in a pickle in the 89th minute.  Any Red Sox fan would recognize the anger building in the partisan New England crowd:  Their team was in the process of getting robbed.    Charles Schwab’s Bethlehem Steel, FC – the first superclub in US professional soccer – had converted a dubious penalty nine minutes before to make it 1-0.   Since then his Pennsylvania Steelmen – stacked with highly paid British talent – had weathered wave after wave of underdog yankee pressure from the hotheaded Rovers – American born to a man.  On top of that, Pawtucket lays barely twenty miles from Fall River, making it a virtual hometown crowd.  The referee looks down at his watch just as an attacking Rovers player is sawn down in the box…. And there is no whistle.

10,000 New England Yankees pour onto the field – some of them literally from the rafters.   The final whistle blows – in the midst of a full-blown riot.

That’s Why American Soccer for me.  It’s coffee with three sugars in a seedy diner, not lukewarm tea with curdled cream at your auntie’s.   I am not promoting New England hooliganism or lax building codes.  I advocate for scrappy underdogs fighting against all odds instead of two teams limited in quality to produce a close match.   For me, American soccer is about a group of US club stars from unlimited teams like the Providence Clamdiggers and the New Bedford Whalers taking us to the semifinals of the first World Cup in 1930 – without giving up a goal.   It’s the story a bunch of players from  teams sponsored by local laundries and car dealers in St. Louis combining with recent immigrants from NYC to sting the English two World Cups later.   It’s the tale of a mullet headed mob of Cosmos fans that that led us back to the competition again forty years later.  It’s about the lowly D3 LA Blues taking a one-goal lead on David Beckham’s LA Galaxy in the 2011 installment of the competition, and the look on Bruce Arena’s face when they did it.  It’s written on bloody mug of a lanky forward from Schaumburg, Illinois.   His left eye is swollen entirely shut and he’s pouring everything onto the field in match between two teams limited by nationality – not a salary cap.

After failing for a century, there is little doubt our closed league pro-sports model is incapable of hosting the unlimited teams that play a critical role in this narrative.    Instead of adopting a system that accommodates great clubs, our federation has decided to allow one league to limit quality in order that they might survive in our system.   Problem is, that system is built for dominant leagues playing domestic sports whose teams are insulated from meaningful international competition.  It doesn’t fit the global market of club soccer.

If you recognize Schwab’s name, chances are it’s not for his fiscal recklessness.   Still, he wouldn’t have allowed a league to limit the quality of his team.  He built one of the greatest clubs in the history of the US game – and a soccer specific stadium to boot – and he didn’t do it simply to make a profit off the game.  By all accounts, he financed one of the better clubs in the world at the time to make his employees and Bethlehem residents proud.

Today, there’s no room in MLS for Chuck.   They wouldn’t allow him a team in the little market town of Bethlehem.   They would prohibit him from importing all of his players from the UK, and paying them whatever he liked for the privilege.

Some may attempt to use the demise of Bethlehem Steel FC a decade and a half after that spectacular cup final as an example of Schwab’s financial folly.   They’ll say it proves unsustainable nature of unlimited soccer clubs.  To them I pose this caveat:  On the eve of the Great Depression, European federations were lining up behind the FA to open their leagues and implement promotion and relegation.  Every one of those open leagues is still with us today.   It was a brilliant move that ushered in a period of remarkable soccer stability in an era of massive financial and political instability.  In that system, leagues couldn’t financially collapse since clubs were the central independent entities.   Eighty years, a world war and countless financial crises later, their system has never allowed the financial irresponsibility of any one club to collapse an entire league.

In contrast, the US pro-sports system has chronically suffocated our club game.  After the crash of ’29,  top flight American club soccer suffered a financial implosion so complete, even Schwab couldn’t escape.   It wiped every American Soccer League club off the map.  The same fate awaited scores of our closed leagues.  Cinderella stories of rag tag local teams fighting their guts out against behemoth superclubs like Bethlehem Steel have proven incapable of sustaining the game – in our closed system.

In order to maintain the Why American Soccer narrative Chuck and I appreciate – and a stable system of leagues – brave leadership from our federation is still required.   It hasn’t materialized yet.  Unlike other US pro-sports leagues, soccer is not a local domestic sport, and our top league does not dominate the world.  Soccer clubs are exposed to high profile and consequential international competition.  No matter the obvious financial protections inherent to our stilted leagues, they have proven incapable of producing a stable system that includes the great unlimited clubs we need to progress.

Since the 1920s, the rest of the world’s soccer federations have adopted a system that allows the game to work on global scale.   It does so by hosting unlimited clubs while adding excitement to games in every league and both ends of every table.   Indeed, Europeans figured out how to accommodate Why American Soccer for billions of supporters like Chuck and I over a century ago.   They devised a free market system that rewards risk takers, entrepreneurs, supporters, players and great clubs that accompanied this great game to global dominance.  They don’t turn away investment in the interest of financial responsibility.

In stark contrast, US Soccer has turned their back on us.  They’ve allowed one league to limit access, quality and even attendance in order to peg the game into a closed sports system designed for provincial leagues playing domestic sports.

In their defense, they have allowed the great US Open Cup to survive.  God bless the Pacific Northwest for caring about it, because today our federation and leagues hardly lift a finger to promote one of the most legacy-laden competitions in the world.  They even scheduled a regular season MLS match on top of the US Open Cup Final in 2011 – an incredible oversight considering the fact that an MLS executive runs US Soccer on a volunteer basis – in his spare time.

Mad as I am that Europe beat us to Why American Soccer in the age of the steam engine, I’m not going to hold it against them.  It’s time to be forthright and magnanimous about this, give them full credit, and come in last in the race to promotion, relegation, and independent clubs, and I am pretty sure Chuck would be with me on this.

He wouldn’t send his team into any match limited for league parity a la MLS.  He wouldn’t send his club into the CONCACAF Champions League limited for domestic competitive balance.   I bet he figured his shrewd supporters wouldn’t take to a club limited in quality by an agreement he signed with Rockefeller, Carnegie and Astor.   That wouldn’t be Why American Soccer for him, and it certainly isn’t for me.